1. Why the concept travels beyond Section 498A

Criminal liability is personal. A person is ordinarily punished for what he himself did. The law makes exceptions, where one person answers for what another did: common intention (Section 34), common object of an unlawful assembly (Section 149), conspiracy (Section 120B) and statutory clauses that make officers answerable for an offence of the company. Because these are exceptions, the courts require the accusation to show the link that justifies them. An omnibus allegation asserts that link in general words (“all of them acted together”, “all the directors are responsible”) without facts.

A related point is that the Penal Code has no general provision for vicarious liability of directors. The Supreme Court said so in Maksud Saiyed v. State of Gujarat (2008) 5 SCC 668, adding that even where a statute provides for such liability, the complainant must make the allegations that bring that provision into play.

A word on the Latin. “Falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus” (false in one thing, false in everything) uses the same Latin word but has nothing to do with omnibus allegations. It is a maxim about appreciation of evidence, and courts treat it only as a rule of caution, not a rule of law.

2. A map of the provisions

3. Section 34 IPC / Section 3(5) BNS

(a) What the section does

Section 34 does not create a separate offence. It lays down a rule of joint liability for a criminal act done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all. The Privy Council settled this in Barendra Kumar Ghosh v. King-Emperor (AIR 1925 PC 1) and Mahbub Shah v. King-Emperor (AIR 1945 PC 118), and the Supreme Court has followed them, for example in Pandurang v. State of Hyderabad (AIR 1955 SC 216). In short, there must be a criminal act, done by several persons, in furtherance of a common intention shared by all, with the accused taking part in it.

(b) Common intention must be shown, not assumed

In Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 INSC 114 (B.R. Gavai and A.G. Masih JJ.), the Supreme Court restored the acquittal of three policemen whom the High Court had convicted under Section 302 read with Section 34 largely because they were in the same vehicle as the main accused. The Court held that the prosecution must establish a prior meeting of minds and that the act must be done in furtherance of the common intention of all.

A different bench in Ram Naresh v. State of U.P. (A.S. Oka and Pankaj Mithal JJ.) explained that common intention means community of purpose and common design, and that it does not require a prior agreement: it can form shortly before or even in the course of the incident. The two decisions are consistent. Both ask for a shared intention shown by facts; they differ only on whether it must precede the act.

(c) Where the omnibus problem appears

The usual form is an FIR that lists several accused and says that they, “in furtherance of common intention”, committed the offences. A Section 34 tag does not supply facts that are missing. In Kahkashan Kausar the charged offences were Sections 341, 323, 379, 354 and 498A read with Section 34, yet the Supreme Court quashed the case against the relatives because the allegations against them were general and omnibus.

The Patna High Court has applied the same approach. In Cr. Misc. No. 7185 of 2024 (decided 24.06.2025, Chandra Shekhar Jha J.), cognizance had been taken by the SDJM, Mohania (Kaimur), on 22.03.2023 for Sections 323, 498-A and 506 read with Section 34 IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act against the complainant’s married sister-in-law and brother-in-law. The High Court found the allegations general and omnibus, noted that the petitioners lived separately, relied on Abhishek v. State of M.P. and quashed the cognizance order.

4. Section 149 IPC / Section 190 BNS

Section 149 works differently from Section 34. It makes every member of an unlawful assembly of five or more persons liable for an offence committed in prosecution of the common object. Two propositions need to be read together:

• Once membership and common object are proved, no separate overt act is needed from each member. The Supreme Court said so in Lalji v. State of U.P. (1989) 1 SCC 437 and repeated it in Haribhau @ Bhausaheb Dinkar Kharuse v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 INSC 1266.
• Membership itself cannot be presumed from a general accusation. In Masalti v. State of U.P. (AIR 1965 SC 202) the Constitution Bench cautioned courts about cases where a large number of persons are accused generally, without reference to the specific role of each. In Zainul v. State of Bihar, 2025 INSC 1192 (decided 7 October 2025), the Supreme Court held that where the allegations are general against a large number, it is safe to convict only those whose presence is consistently established from the FIR stage and to whom overt acts in furtherance of the common object are attributed. A mere bystander with no role is outside Section 149.

The omnibus objection therefore attacks the first step (is this person really a member who shared the object?) and not the second (does a member need an overt act?).

Patna High Court: a non-matrimonial example

_Pannalal Sah @ Pannalal Prasad v. State of Bihar_, Cr. Misc. No. 37331 of 2016, Patna High Court, decided 18 February 2025 (Jitendra Kumar J.). The complainant had lodged an FIR naming Pannalal Sah and 15–20 unknown persons for rioting and related offences (Sections 147, 148, 385 and another section recorded as 489 in the order) over a land dispute. The police investigated and filed a closure report, which the Magistrate accepted. The complainant’s protest petition was treated as a complaint, and after the inquiry under Section 200 CrPC the Magistrate took cognizance on 25.04.2016. The High Court found that the statements before the Magistrate were general and omnibus, that no specific role was alleged against the first petitioner, that the second petitioner’s name was not even mentioned by the complainant or his witnesses, and that the complainant had himself said he was in possession of the land, which made the allegation of forcible dispossession absurd. It noted the independent police finding that the allegation was false and a civil dispute over the land, quashed the cognizance order, and left the complainant to his civil remedy.

The judgment also holds, relying on Md. Naushad Khan v. State of Bihar, 2023 SCC OnLine Pat 9587, that a petition under Section 482 CrPC does not become infructuous because the trial has moved ahead; the High Court can still entertain it until the trial reaches the stage of judgment.

5. Criminal conspiracy: Section 120B IPC / Section 61(2) BNS

Conspiracy needs an agreement between two or more persons to do an illegal act or a legal act by illegal means. It is a substantive offence even if no overt act follows (State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu, (2005) 11 SCC 600), and it is usually proved by circumstances. These features make it the easiest charge to plead in omnibus form: “the accused conspired with one another to cheat the complainant” says nothing about who agreed with whom, to do what.

The Supreme Court has been firm that the substance, not the label, matters. In Vipin Sahni v. CBI, 2024 INSC 284, it upheld the discharge of the appellants from charges of cheating and conspiracy. In the PMLA case of Pavana Dibbur v. Directorate of Enforcement (decided 29.11.2023), it held that Section 120B IPC becomes a scheduled offence only if the conspiracy alleged is to commit an offence that is itself in the Schedule, so a general allegation of conspiracy cannot be used to borrow a scheduled offence.

6. Directors and officers under the Penal Code

Because the Penal Code has no vicarious-liability clause, a director or managing director can be prosecuted for an IPC offence only on allegations of his own active role with the necessary intent. The Supreme Court has applied this in several settings:

• Maksud Saiyed v. State of Gujarat (2008) 5 SCC 668: no vicarious liability under the Penal Code unless a statute provides it, and the complaint must still make the requisite allegations.
• Sharad Kumar Sanghi v. Sangita Rane (2015) 12 SCC 78: vague allegations against a managing director in a cheating case are a ground for quashing under Section 482 CrPC.
• Sunil Bharti Mittal v. CBI (2015) 4 SCC 609: a director can be proceeded against only if there is material showing his active role coupled with criminal intent, or if a statute provides for vicarious liability.
• Shiv Kumar Jatia v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2019): the Supreme Court set aside the Delhi High Court’s refusal to quash proceedings against a hotel’s managing director where the allegations against him were vague, following Maksud Saiyed and Sharad Kumar Sanghi.

7. Company statutes: Section 141 NI Act and similar clauses

(a) The two-stage test

Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act makes persons “in charge of, and responsible to, the company for the conduct of its business” liable when the company commits an offence under Section 138. The cases set out a two-stage position:

• Stage one: the averment. In S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals v. Neeta Bhalla (2005) 8 SCC 89 the Court held that merely being a director is not enough, and the complaint must say how the accused was in charge of and responsible for the business at the relevant time. In Gunmala Sales Pvt. Ltd. v. Anu Mehta (2015) 1 SCC 103 (decided 17 October 2014) the Court explained that once the complaint contains that basic averment, the Magistrate can issue process.
• Stage two: the quashing petition. Under Section 482 CrPC the High Court, on an overall reading of the complaint, may refuse to quash where the basic averment is there, or may quash where unimpeachable material shows that the director had no role at the relevant time (for example, resignation before the cheque was issued). A bare statement of designation, with no such averment, is the omnibus allegation.

Recent decisions apply this to directors with limited roles. In Susela Padmavathy Amma v. Bharti Airtel Ltd. (2024) the Supreme Court found the averments against the appellant director insufficient. In K.S. Mehta v. Morgan Securities and Credits Pvt. Ltd., 2025 INSC 315, it quashed Section 138/141 proceedings against a non-executive director, holding that attending board meetings does not make a director liable and that specific allegations of direct involvement are needed.

8. At which stage is the objection taken?

9. The limits of the doctrine

• Joint liability does not need identical acts. Under Sections 34 and 149, different accused may do different things. The omnibus objection fails if the facts show each accused’s part in the shared design or object (Lalji; Haribhau).
• Specific does not mean detailed. A complaint need not plead evidence. At the process stage a basic averment can be enough in NI Act cases (Gunmala Sales).
• No mini-trial. The High Court tests the material against the Bhajan Lal categories and does not weigh evidence. It can, however, look at the whole record, and in vexatious cases read between the lines (Mahmood Ali).
• The record may cure the vagueness. If the chargesheet, the inquiry statements under Sections 200 and 202 CrPC or documents supply the role of the accused, the allegation is no longer omnibus.
• Conspiracy is proved by inference. The absence of a direct act does not by itself defeat a conspiracy charge, but circumstances must point to an agreement and not merely to suspicion.

For the accused

• Identify how the law fixes liability on your client: directly, through Section 34 or 149, through Section 120B, or through a statutory clause on companies.
• Prepare an accused-by-accused chart of what is alleged in the FIR, the Section 161 statements, and the Section 200 and 202 statements.
• Look for context markers: a closure report, a pending civil suit, an admission that contradicts the allegation (as in Pannalal Sah), or separate residence.
• For a director, check whether the statute has a vicarious-liability clause. If it is an IPC offence, rely on Maksud Saiyed and Sunil Bharti Mittal.

For the complainant

• Give each accused a separate act, date, place and witness, and in company cases state the role in the business.
• Use Sections 34, 149 and 120B only with facts that show a shared intention, object or agreement.